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NOTES
An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles Are
Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment
What are the constitutional rights of persons who have been deprived of their liberty through civil commitment? 1 This vexing question has involved the federal courts in much litigation over the past
two decades. At the center of the debate is the asserted right of civilly
committed persons to receive rehabilitative treatment. Beginning in
1966 with the landmark case of Rouse v. Cameron, 2 this "right to
treatment"3 has gained a significant degree of acceptance in the lower
federal courts.4 Buoyed by an "unusual amount" of scholarly support, 5 these courts have held that the due process clause of the four1. The justification for depriving a person of his or her liberty is the critical factor in distinguishing civil from criminal commitment. When society invokes the criminal laws to incarcerate
certain of its members, it has determined that their conduct is "so reprehensible and injurious to
others that they must be punished to deter them and others from crime." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., concurring). In other contexts, however, society
desires to pursue legitimate interests without necessarily punishing the persons who threaten
those interests. A mentally ill person, for example, may pose enough of a danger to himself or
society to warrant his incarceration. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1975). Yet
the state has no interest in punishing those who are mentally incapable of conforming their
behavior to the norms of society. To accommodate the interests of society and the individual, the
state will invoke its civil laws to confine such persons under conditions that - at least in theory
- are less intrusive and less stigmatizing than those that accompany criminal conviction. See
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
2. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
3. The term "right to treatment" has become a term of art in the scholarly literature. See,
e.g., Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Volenik, Right to
Treatment: Case Developments in Juvenile Law, 3 Jusr. SYS. J. 292 (1978). The phrase is not
very descriptive, however, in that "treatment" may encompass both rehabilitative programs
aimed at alleviating the behavioral problems that necessitated confinement and more narrowly
prescribed attempts to prevent the deterioration of the confinee's condition or to reduce the intrusiveness of the confinement. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1982)
(involuntarily confined mental patient entitled to adequate training to ensure bodily safety and a
minimum of physical restraint); see also UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 487-88 (1980). This Note concerns itself with the
right to treatment in the broader sense - the right of juvenile delinquents to receive minimally
adequate training designed to alleviate the behavioral problems that led to their incarceration.
4. Rouse itself found that involuntarily confined mental patients were entitled to treatment as
a matter of statutory interpretation. 373 F.2d at 453-55. The first case to lay a constitutional
foundation for the right was Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See notes 7
& 79 infra and accompanying text. On two occasions the Supreme Court has had an opportunity
to reach the constitutional issue, only to resolve the case on narrower grounds. See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
5. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 973 (D.P.R. 1982), ajfd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir.
1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). See the references collected in Shephard, Challenging
the Rehabilitative Justification for Indeterminate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The
Right to Punishment, 21 ST. Loms U. L.J. 12, 22 n.57 (1977).
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teenth amendment, and, perhaps, the eighth amendment, require the
states to provide civilly committed persons with some minimum
amount6 of rehabilitative treatment.
While the initial right to treatment cases dealt primarily with the
mentally ill,7 courts soon extended the logic of these cases to the incarceration of juvenile offenders. 8 Before long, several district courts,9 as
well as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 10 had concluded
that involuntarily incarcerated juveniles have a constitutional right to
minimally adequate rehabilitative treatment. Recently, however, the
First Circuit became the first court of appeals firmly to reject the notion that the Constitution guarantees a right to treatment to incarcerated juvenile offenders. 11
This Note attempts to resolve the arguments presented in the literature and the case law and determine whether the federal Constitution
mandates a right to treatment for involuntarily incarcerated juveniles.
Part I examines the varied situations that have given rise to right to
treatment claims. Part II elucidates the three principal theories on
which right to treatment claims have been based: (1) that because the
purpose of incarcerating juveniles is to promote their welfare, rehabilitation is mandated by the due process requirement that the nature of
the commitment "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed"; 12 (2) that rehabilitation is required as the quid pro quo for the reduced procedural safeguards af6. The courts have been very reluctant to displace medical knowledge in deciding what and
how much treatment is mandated. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147, 166-69 (3d Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 999 (5th
Cir. 1977) (court not in position to monitor day-by-day changes that affect rehabilitative programs). Instead, they have merely insisted in vague terms that the required treatment be "minimally adequate." Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 176 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); see also UNITED STATES
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DISPOSmONS AND CoRRECTIONS: A CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF STANDARDS AND STATE PRACTICES 65-66 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
8. See, e.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (analogizing to
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), in finding a constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily incarcerated juveniles).
9. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Pena v. New
York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F.
Supp. 53, 70-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977);
Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), ajfd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
10. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
Prior to Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984)
(discussed in text at note 11 infra), the only other court of appeals to consider this question was
the Fifth Circuit in Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). Without finally deciding
the issue, the Fifth Circuit expressed strong doubt about the existence of a right to treatment.
562 F.2d at 997-98.
11. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974
(1984).
12. See notes 34-38 infra and accompanying text.
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forded in juvenile proceedings; 13 and (3) that confinement absent
rehabilitation violates evolving standards of decency in contravention
of the eighth amendment.14
With respect to the constitutional theories outlined above, Part III
concludes (1) that rehabilitation is required by the due process clause
when the state must rely on a rehabilitative purpose to justify its confinement of the juvenile, but not when the state may incarcerate the
juvenile through an exercise of its police power; 15 (2) that the reduction of procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings should not give
rise to a substantive constitutional right to rehabilitation; 16 and (3)
that rehabilitation is required by the eighth amendment where, as in
(1), the state must rely on a rehabilitative purpose to justify the juvenile's confinement. The protections offered by the eighth amendment
are therefore found to be coextensive with those provided by the due
process clause. 17
The Note infers from these separate conclusions that there is no
single answer to the question of whether involuntarily incarcerated
juveniles possess a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment. The
Note concludes that the existence of such a right depends ultimately
on an evaluation of the delinquent act that led to the juvenile's
incarceration.

I.

FACTUAL VARIATION IN RIGHT TO TREATMENT CASES

Traditionally, society has affixed the label "juvenile delinquent" to
those children confined as a consequence of their "misbehavior.'' 18
That "misbehavior" may range from criminal acts such as "robbery,
auto theft, or burglary" to noncriminal conduct such as "habitual truancy. "19 While common sense suggests that societal power over delinquent juveniles should vary according to the severity of their conduct,
the legal definition of juvenile delinquency is broad enough to encompass each of these manifestations of waywardness. 20
13. See notes 39-45 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 57-94 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 95-132 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 133-53 infra and accompanying text.
18. See T. PHELPS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW 33 (1976).
19. Id. at 35.
20. See id. at 35; see also R. MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES xi (1973) (a finding of delinquency may be premised on a "violation of the law or ordinance by an individual below the legal
adult age of the community," and "acts or courses of conduct deemed socially, morally, [or]
physiologically undesirable for children," such as truancy, disobedience of parents, and consumption of alcoholic beverages).
Courts faced with right to treatment claims have failed to consider adequately that acts of
juvenile delinquency vary greatly in degree. This Note argues that any adjudication of the rights
of juvenile delinquents must, in the first instance, inquire into the type of "misbehavior" that
warrants the juvenile's confinement. See notes 89-94 infra and accompanying text.
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The lower federal court decisions asserting a right to treatment for
juvenile offenders illustrate the variety of factual settings in which
such claims arise. In one of the earlier decisions, juveniles who had
been designated "PINS" - persons in need of supervision21 - were
"temporarily"22 confined in juvenile centers. Under New York law,
PINS included truants, runaways, and children deemed "ungovemable. "23 None of the children had committed acts that, if committed
by adults, would have constituted crimes.24 Similarly, in Morgan v.
Sproat, Mississippi law defined a delinquent child as "any child 'whose
occupation, behavior, environment or associations are injurious to his
welfare or the welfare of other children.' " 25 This definition was read
to encompass the habitually disobedient, the wilfully truant, and those
who had violated school rules. 26
By way of contrast, Nelson v. Heyne involved a group of boys ages
twelve to eighteen confined in a medium security correctional institution.27 Of the almost 400 inmates, approximately two-thirds had committed criminal acts. 28 Morales v. Turman involved a class of juveniles
who had been adjudicated "delinquent" and involuntarily committed
to the custody of the Texas Youth Council.29 The Council operated
six "training" schools, three for girls and three for boys. 30 Of the
males, sixty percent were committed for crimes of stealing, nine percent for crimes of violence, nineteen percent for disobedience and immoral conduct, and sixteen percent for other reasons. 31 For the
females, the figures were fifteen, four, sixty-eight, and thirteen percent
respectively. 32 As these cases illustrate, juveniles may be incarcerated
for a broad range of delinquent acts that differ markedly in their
severity.
21. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
22. The detention was theoretically temporary. In practice, juveniles were often confined in
excess of 100 days. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Had the
detention truly been temporary, the court intimated that no right to treatment would have arisen.
349 F. Supp. at 601-02.
23. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp, 575, 578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
24. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
25. 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (quoting MISS. CooE ANN. § 43-21-5 (1972)).
26. 432 F. Supp. at 1134.
27. 355 F. Supp. 451, 453 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
28. 355 F. Supp. at 453. The court did not elaborate on the severity of the criminal acts.
29. 383 F. Supp. 53, 58 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S.
322 (1977).
30. 383 F. Supp. at 58.
31. 383 F. Supp. at 59. Since these figures add up to 104%, there was obviously some slight
error in the district court's calculations.
32. 383 F. Supp. at 59.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT

In each case discussed in Part I, the court found that the juveniles
had a right to treatment under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 33 The due process argument, in tum, consists of two alternative theories. The first theory, the "purpose" argument, is based
on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Jackson v. Indiana that due
process requires "the nature and duration of commitment" to "bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." 34 The state's authority over delinquent juveniles, it is
urged, derives from its parens patriae 35 interest in their welfare. 36 The
purpose of confinement is therefore to aid the juvenile, which can be
accomplished only through efforts to rehabilitate the child and "reestablish" him or her in society. 37 Thus, the right to treatment alleg33. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Morales v. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53, 70-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322
(1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), ajfd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585, 598-600
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Two other district courts have also held that the due process clause affords involuntarily
confined juveniles a right to rehabilitative treatment. See Pena v. New York State Div. for
Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck,
346 F. Supp. 1354, 1363-65 (D.R.I. 1972).
34. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
35. BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 911 (3d ed. 1969), defines the parens patriae doctrine
as "[t]he doctrine that all orphans, dependent children, and incompetent persons, are within the
special protection, and under the control, of the state." See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
265 (1984) (state's role as parens patriae is to preserve and promote the welfare of the child); cf.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing the parens patriae power as the authority vested in
the state to act "in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the
person of the child," but noting that the precise meaning of the phrase is "murky" and its historic credentials of "dubious relevance").
36. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (cited approvingly in
Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Miss. 1977)), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
At least one court has questioned whether the state's obligation to promote the welfare of the
child encompasses rehabilitative treatment, arguing that mere removal of the juvenile from an
unhealthy environment is a valid exercise of the state's parens patriae power. Santana v. Collazo,
714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); cf. Morales v. Turman,
562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The Constitution does not specify in what manner a state
may exercise its parens patriae power. Historically, the states merely provided custodial care for
the incompetent or mentally ill."). This argument must fail, however, in that it ignores both the
realities of "custodial" confinement and the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the
scope of the parens patriae power. It is fallacious to contend that the state acts in the child's
welfare when it removes him from an unsafe environment and places him in an equally harsh
institution. See note 138 infra. Moreover, that child will eventually be returned to society,
where he is likely to confront the same problems that led to his initial incarceration. It is difficult
to say that society truly aids the juvenile when it temporarily removes him from an unhealthy
environment only to return him to society ill-equipped to function as a responsible citizen. In·
deed, after being "warehoused" in a juvenile facility for an extended period of time, it is not
inconceivable that the juvenile will emerge even worse off than when society first interposed itself
between him and his "unhealthy environment." See note 153 infra. It is perhaps in recognition
of these realities that the Supreme Court has found the parens patriae authority to include the
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edly follows from Jackson's insistence that the nature of commitment
bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of that commitment. 38
The second due process argument on which right to treatment
claims have been founded is the "quid pro quo" argument. 39 According to this theory, incarcerated juveniles have a right to treatment because they generally receive less procedural protection than adults. A
line of Supreme Court cases40 has found it constitutionally permissible
for a state, in juvenile proceedings, to dispense with certain procedural
safeguards that are mandated in criminal trials of adults. 41 This denial
is justified by reference to the rehabilitative, as opposed to the punitive, goals of the juvenile justice system. 42 The hope is that freeing the
states from the strict procedural requirements of the adult criminal
justice system will afford them greater latitude in pursuing the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system.43 Since the denial of procedural
due process is seemingly predicated on the pursuit of rehabilitative
goals, it is argued that the denial is constitutionally impermissible unless the state provides the expected rehabilitation.44 In short, due process requires the state to offer treatment as the quid pro quo for the
deprivation of procedural safeguards.45
Finally, a number of courts have suggested that the eighth
amendment46 may afford an independent basis for the right to treatprovision of rehabilitative treatment. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1312 (1978)
(probation officer, who exercises the authority of the state as parens patriae, has duty to implement "the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile court") (quoting In re Michael C.,
21 Cal. 3d 471, 476, 579 P.2d 7, 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1978)) (emphasis added); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) ("There is much evidence that some juvenile courts
•.. lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the
state in a parens patriae capacity .•.. There is evidence, in fact, that ... the child receives .••
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.").
38. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revel, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
40. See Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 458-59 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (describing the Supreme Court precedent in this area).
41. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), for example, held that a state need not
provide a juvenile offender with a trial by jury.
42. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984).
43. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5, 547 (1971) (no constitutional right
to jury trial in juvenile proceedings so that state may be free to devote its resources and ingenuity
to the pursuit of rehabilitative goals); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (procedural strictures should not be permitted to interfere with the states' purpose in
creating juvenile courts, including the "worthy goal" of rehabilitating the juvenile).
44. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
45. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th
Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
46. By its terms, the eighth amendment proscribes "[e]xcessive bail," "excessive fines," and
"cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.

292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:286

ment. 47 It is fair to say, however, that none of the courts that have
alluded to a right to treatment arising under the eighth amendment
have made the slightest attempt to develop this theory. In Martarella
v. Kelley, the court indiscriminately merged the fourteenth and eighth
amendment sources of the right, concluding that "[w]here the State, as
parens patriae, imposes such detention, it can meet the Constitution's
requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment if, and only if, it furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee. "48 In Morales v. Turman 49 and Morgan v. Sproat, so the courts
merely asserted that the strictures of the eighth amendment apply to
conditions of civil confinement. 51 Apart from this bare conclusion,
neither court even stopped to consider whether the punishment being
inflicted upon the juveniles - incarceration without rehabilitative
treatment - could properly be deemed "cruel and unusual."
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES EXAMINED

The courts have differed significantly regarding the relative weight
of the constitutional arguments discussed in Part II. In Morgan v.
Sproat, 52 the court embraced both the purpose and the quid pro quo
arguments, concluding that the right to treatment was supported independently by each of these "two equally sound theories." 53 The court
in Martarel/a v. Kelley 54 was less bold; while concluding that the right
to treatment undoubtedly existed, it hedged as to whether that right
was based on "due process, equal protection or the Eighth Amendment, or a combination of them." 55 And, in rejecting the existence of
a right to treatment, the First Circuit completely derogated the quid
pro quo argument, concluding that it had "even less merit" than the
purpose argument. 56 Thus, it remains unclear whether any of these
47. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 383 F.
Supp. 53, 70 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd.. 430 U.S. 322 {1977);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
48. 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1429
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (accepting Martarel/a's conclusory statement that detention of juveniles without treatment implicates both due process and cruel and unusual punishment concerns).
49. 383 F. Supp. 53, 70 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S.
322 (1977).
50. 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
51. The Supreme Court has never had occasion to apply the eighth amendment outside the
context of criminal punishment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977). However, a
persuasive argument can be made that conditions of juvenile confinement should be scrutinized
under eighth amendment standards. See notes 134-41 infra and accompanying text.
52. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
53. 432 F. Supp. at 1135-36.
54. 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
55. 349 F. Supp. at 599.
56. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974
(1984).
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theories, either independently or in combination, support a constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily confined juveniles.
A.

The Purpose Argument

In Jackson v. Indiana, 57 the Supreme Court established the requirement that the nature of civil confinement bear a reasonable relation to its purpose. 58 Jackson itself, however, involved the
commitment of a criminal defendant who, due to mental illness, was
deemed incompetent to stand trial. 59 The purpose of the commitment
- to aid the defendant in attaining competency through custodial care
and treatment - was not in dispute. 60 Due process therefore obligated the state to treat the defendant, or, in the absence of treatment,
to release him. 6 1 Obviously, the Court had no occasion to examine the
purpose(s) of the juvenile justice system when it insisted in Jackson
that states conform the nature of civil commitment to its purpose.
However, on other occasions the Supreme Court has had ample
opportunity to consider the objectives of the juvenile system. Indeed, a
series of Court decisions in the juvenile justice area can be read for the
proposition that the very existence of juvenile courts as a separate system is justified primarily by reference to rehabilitative goals. In Kent
v. United States, 62 for example, the Court expressly noted that the
state's authority over juvenile delinquents proceeds from a parens patriae rationale. 63 Observing that the "theoretical" purpose of juvenile
courts is to determine the needs of children and society rather than to
adjudicate criminal conduct, the Court expressed concern with the
fact that, in practice, juveniles are often deprived of the "solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 64 In subsequent cases involving the due process requirements of juvenile proceedings, the Court has echoed this theme. 65
57. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
58. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
59. 406 U.S. at 717-19, 738.
60. 406 U.S. at 738.
61. 406 U.S. at 738.
62. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
63. 383 U.S. at 554-56.
64. 383 U.S. at 554-56.
65. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5 (1971) ("In theory the juvenile
court was to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive...• In theory it was to exercise its
protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold .•.. In theory it was to concentrate
on each case the best of current social science learning.") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967)); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967):
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties .... They believed that
society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What
is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from a downward career." ... The child was to be "treated"
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The Court's characterization of the purpose of the juvenile justice
system is supported by the voluminous scholarly literature on the subject.6 6 One author writes:
Traditional juvenile justice philosophy depicts the Uuvenile] court as
non-punitive and therapeutic, a legal institution whose espoused goals
are the protection and guidance of children . . . . [T]he prevailing interpretation of the court has depicted it as an expression of humanitarian
sentiments in which children are not truly capable of criminal intent and
the state, embodying the principle of parens patriae, is the benevolent
protector. 67

While focusing on the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile justice
system, both the Court and academia have nevertheless recognized
that society may have other valid interests in confining juvenile delinquents. Foremost among those interests is the protection of society. 68
As noted _earlier, many involuntarily confined juveniles have committed criminal acts that evidence a significant danger to society. 6 9
Though society may wish to eschew the full weight of criminal penalties for offenses of this kind,7° it may - and in fact does - retain a
significant interest in preventing the recurrence of such "antisocial"
and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.
(Footnote omitted). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing the "beneficent and rehabilitative purposes" of the states'
juvenile court systems).
66. See Gottfredson, Chandler & Cohen, Legal Aim, Discretion, and Social Control: A Case
Study of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 95, 97 (1983):
The growth of the juvenile court movement in the United States has been traced to the idea
that, in setting the proper role for state intervention in the lives of adjudicated delinquents,
the rehabilitative ideal should predominate. The strong preference for considering the reha·
bilitative needs of the juvenile offender ... is reflected in statutes governing the disposition
of juveniles, in case co=entary and decisions, and in the professional literature.
67. M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT 1 (1982); see also Polier, Prescriptions for
Reform: Doing What We Set Out to Do?, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY
AND CURRENT REFORMS 217 (L. Empey ed. 1979) (juvenile court movement founded on prem·
ise that society would provide care, support, and rehabilitative services as needed); R. MENNEL,
supra note 20, at xxvii (juvenile justice system designed to ensure that juvenile delinquents are
suitably corrected and reformed); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVE·
NILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two
WORLDS 15 (1982) (ultimately, parens patriae theory became the constitutional foundation for a
separate system of juvenile courts).
68. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) ("We have stressed before that crime
prevention is a 'weighty social objective,' and this interest persists undiluted in the juvenile context.") (citation omitted); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n.6 (1971) (While rehabilitating offenders
is appropriately the primary way of dealing with children, the "guiding consideration for a court
of law that deals with threatening conduct is nonetheless protection of the community.") (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OP JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967)); T. PHELPS,
supra note 18, at 217; UNITED STATES DEPT. OP JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 7 (society must strike
proper balance between the "dual juvenile court goals of rehabilitating youth and protecting
society").
69. See text at notes 27-32 supra.
70. See note 1 supra; notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
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behavior. 71 To vindicate this interest, a state may exercise its police
power to incarcerate those juveniles who pose a significant danger to
society. 72
Arguably, certain juveniles may be subjected to a deprivation of
liberty only by an exercise of the state's parens patriae power. It is
difficult to conceive how "habitual truants and runaways,"73 for example, would pose a significant enough "danger" to society to justify
their confinement under the state's police power. 74 Normally, a juvenile's parents would be expected to eradicate such misbehavior, and
only when they failed would the state be empowered to fill their shoes
in its traditional role as parens patriae. 15 In these situations, the state
must actually invoke the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system in order to deprive the juvenile of his or her liberty.76 Absent its
interest in providing for the juvenile's welfare, the state would be powerless to confine the juvenile. Because the state must rely on a rehabilitative purpose to support the juvenile's incarceration, the limitations
on the nature of confinement enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana 11 apply
with full force. 1s When a deprivation of liberty is justified on "the
71. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-65, 274 (1984) (need to protect society justifies preventive
detention of juveniles likely to commit crimes if released).
73. See text at notes 19 & 23 supra.
74. This is not to suggest that the state may not combat truancy or noncriminal delinquency
through the exercise of its police power. Traditionally, the police power has been employed by
state and local governments to promote and maintain the health, morals, safety and "general
welfare" of the public. See, e.g., East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 411 (1935). However, the issue is not
whether the state may exercise its police power - perhaps in the guise of the infamous "truant
officer" - to deter truancy or other acts of domestic disobedience. Rather, the critical question
is whether the police power supports the involuntary confinement of juveniles who have committed such relatively innocuous acts. Historically, it seems clear that confinement under the police
power was limited to acts that posed a more serious danger to society, whereas the parens patriae
power provided the sole justification for confining children with behavioral problems. See Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 285-87 (D. Md. 1979) ("Dangerousness to others results in
commitment under the State's police powers, whereas dangerousness to oneself provides the rationale for commitment by the State's parens patriae powers."); note 75 infra; see also Lynch v.
Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1984) ("When it is attempting to protect society from the
dangerous mentally ill, the state is using its police power. When it is acting as a parent to care for
those incapable of helping themselves, the state is employing its parens patriae power.") (footnote
omitted); cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[I]n the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society
from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or co=unicable disease.") (emphasis added).
75. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("Children, by definition, are not assumed
to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of
their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae. ");In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17, 30 (1967) ("If ... parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions ... the state may intervene."); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966)
(exercise of parens patriae power places state in "parental" role).
76. See notes 37 & 74 supra.
77. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
78. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975) ("Where 'treatment' is
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altruistic theory" that the confinement is for "humane therapeutic reasons," a failure to provide rehabilitative treatment "violates the very
fundamentals of due process."7 9
The more difficult issue is whether Jackson applies to juvenile confinement that may be fully justified by either the police or the parens
patriae power. When a juvenile is confined for an act that, if he or she
were an adult, would constitute a criminal offense, the state may justify the confinement by citing the need to protect society. 80 However,
the fact that the juvenile is processed through a system purposely demarcated from the adult criminal justice system suggests that protection of society is not the sole81 purpose of confinement. Since a
juvenile may not be capable of the same criminal intent as an adult, 82
and since juveniles are arguably more amenable to rehabilitation, 83
one can argue that the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system
obtain wholly apart from the seriousness of the offense. In short, society may have an interest in rehabilitating all juvenile delinquents, irrespective of the nature of their delinquent acts.
The difficulty with the above argument is that it confuses the traditional objectives of the juvenile justice system with the authority vested
in the state to confine juveniles for acts of delinquency. By emphasizing its interest in rehabilitating juveniles, the state may well assume a
moral obligation to provide adequate treatment. 84 A mere statement
of interest, however, does not elevate the right to treatment to constitutional dimensions. 85 Only when rehabilitation is the sole purpose
and justification for depriving a juvenile of his or her liberty does the
due process clause create a right to receive that rehabilitation. Where
the deprivation of liberty is unauthorized absent a rehabilitative purthe sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest
that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present.") (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)). The Court explicitly refused to consider whether mentally
ill patients who did pose a danger to society were likewise entitled to treatment. 422 U.S. at 573.
79. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
80. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 78 supra.
82. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1971) (White, J., concurring)
("Reprehensible acts by juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent
choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control."); M. BORlNER, supra note 67; text at note 67 supra. But see note 147 infra.
83. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-66 n.15 (1984) ("Our society recognizes that
juveniles in general are in the earlier stages of their emotional growth ..• and that their value
systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted.") (quoting People v. Schupf, 39
N.Y.2d 682, 687, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (1976)).
84. Choosing to rehabilitate juvenile offenders may therefore be wise as a matter of social
policy. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Santana v. Collazo, 714
F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
85. Obviously, a multitude of state activities are undertaken with an avowed purpose. For
instance, a state may construct a highway system for the purpose of facilitating automobile
travel. No one would seriously contend that the state's acknowledged purpose in building the
highway system elevated automobile travel to a constitutional right.
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pose, a state acts arbitrarily, and therefore in contravention of the due
process clause, when it denies the juvenile the very rehabilitation that
supports the confinement. 86 However, where the deprivation is legitimate even in the absence of a rehabilitative purpose, the state need not
rely on such a purpose to deprive the juvenile of his or her liberty, and
it is therefore not constrained by the due process clause from weighing
the social utility of providing rehabilitative treatment.
While the state may therefore have a general interest in rehabilitating all juvenile offenders, it nonetheless has the power to incarcerate
certain juveniles solely in order to protect society from their antisocial
acts. 87 No one would suggest, I take it, that the lack of financial resources or psychiatric knowledge to maintain successful rehabilitative
programs would deprive the state of the power to remove dangerous
juveniles from society. The fact that the police power may, in certain
instances, constitute an independent and sufficient basis for confining
delinquent juveniles undermines the assertion that all incarcerated
juveniles, regardless of the nature of their delinquency, are entitled by
the Constitution to rehabilitative treatment.
This conclusion, of course, does not imply that the purpose argument is without merit. 88 Rather, it merely rejects the existence of an
absolute right to treatment in all cases involving the confinement of
juvenile offenders. Unfortunately, the need to draw precise factual distinctions among juvenile offenders has been ignored by those lower
federal courts that have entertained right to treatment claims. Only
one of these courts has intimated that its decision was influenced by
the type of misbehavior that justified the juvenile's confinement. 89
86. See Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 535 F.2d 864 (5th
Cir. 1976), revd., 430 U.S. 322 (1977) ("[U]nder the parens patriae theory, the juvenile must be
given treatment lest the involuntary commitment amount to an arbitrary exercise ofgovernmental
power proscribed by the due process clause.") (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984).
88. Indeed, a recent study by the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that the purpose argument, as construed by this Note, will support a constitutional right to treatment in a
significant number of cases. According to the ABA Journal, the study reveals that juveniles are
often incarcerated for "offenses" that are "as minor as vagrancy and running away from home."
Jailed Juveniles, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 32. Only about 10% of jailed juveniles are charged
with serious crimes, and 25% have committed no crime at all. These results suggest that many
incarcerated juveniles pose no danger to society, and are confined through an exercise of the
state's parens patriae power. Under the test proposed by this Note, these juveniles would be
entitled by the Constitution to some form of rehabilitative treatment. See notes 73-79 supra and
accompanying text; notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text.
89. See Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D.R.I.
1972) ("And whatever deviation, if any, from this goal of rehabilitation which might be tolerated
as to those incarcerated juveniles convicted of violations of the criminal laws, such deviations are
far less tolerable for the other classes of children incarcerated by the state.") (emphasis added).
In Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court did take great pains to
clarify the distinctions, under New York law, between "PINS" (persons in need of supervision)
and "IDs" (juvenile delinquents). "IDs," in contrast to "PINS," had committed acts that would
have been criminal if committed by adults. 349 F. Supp. at 579. Nevertheless, the court's discus-
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This all-or-nothing approach is fraught with peril for those juveniles
with meritorious constitutional claims. Unwilling to condition the
state's power to confine dangerous juveniles on the provision of adequate rehabilitative treatment, a court may well reject the claims of
nondangerous juveniles rather than embrace a broad constitutional
right to treatment. 90 A state may thereby escape its obligation to conform the nature of juvenile confinement to its purpose simply because
it is entitled to incarcerate some juveniles for the protection of society.
What is necessary in each case is a factual inquiry into the basis of
the state's jurisdiction over the delinquent juvenile. Where the state,
by statute, authorizes confinement for the purpose of "care and treatment," it is obvious that the dictates of Jackson v. Indiana 91 are violated when that treatment is not forthcoming. 92 Even when the
statute enumerates several possible justifications for commitment,93 a
judicial finding that the confinement is not supported by the need to
protect society should also be enough to trigger the right to treatment.
However, when the police power is sufficient in and of itself to support
the confinement, no constitutional obligation to provide treatment
should arise. The inquiry must always center on the acts of delinquency that have precipitated the incarceration of the juvenile.94
sion of the right to treatment proceeded in general terms, with no explicit distinctions drawn
between the two classes of incarcerated juveniles. Indeed, the court noted with seeming approval
that the right to "effective treatment" had previously been applied to all children, "whether
delinquent or merely in need of supervision." 349 F. Supp. at 598.
90. It is conceivable that this fear dissuaded the First Circuit from finding even a limited
constitutional right to treatment in Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). Santana involved a group of juveniles committed pursuant to the
"Minor's Law" of Puerto Rico, which authorizes a judge to confine neglected or undisciplined
children upon a finding that the children's own welfare is threatened. Although juveniles who
pose a danger to the community are within the statute's sweep, there is no explicit requirement
that the children pose a threat to anyone other than themselves. 714 F.2d at 1177 n.2, 1180.
Despite this apparently favorable factual setting, cf notes 27-32 supra and accompanying
text, the plaintiffs urged a broad constitutional right to treatment upon the court. In denying the
existence of such a right, the court thought it significant that states may, under appropriate
circumstances, confine individuals "solely to protect society from them." 714 F.2d at 1176. The
court's reliance on a hypothetical threat to the community was misplaced, however, in that the
statute expressly provided for confinement on alternative grounds. Arguably, the court was reluctant to posit a broad constitutional right to treatment for fear that Puerto Rico could not meet
an obligation to provide treatment to those juveniles who did pose a danger to the welfare of the
community. This suggests that the result may have been somewhat different had individual
members of the plaintiff class been able to demonstrate that only their own welfare was at stake.
91. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
92. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(where state statute authorizes commitment for "care and treatment," confinement without
treatment fails to bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of that confinement).
93. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984); note 90 supra.
94. See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
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The Quid Pro Quo Argument

The quid pro quo argument derives from the fact that the Supreme
Court, in recognition of the beneficent purpose of juvenile justice, has
permitted states to reduce the procedural safeguards available to
juveniles in civil commitment proceedings.95 The quid pro quo for this
deprivation, it is argued, is the provision of rehabilitative treatment.96
In rejecting the quid pro quo argument, the First Circuit in
Santana v. Collazo9 7 emphasized the flexibility inherent in the concept
of due process. 98 As the Supreme Court has indicated on numerous
occasions, there is no single answer to the question of what process is
due. 99 Rather, "the demands of due process differ according to the
interests of the individual and of society in the given situation." 100
The Supreme Court, the First Circuit observed, has already examined
the demands of due process in the juvenile context and held that it is
constitutionally acceptable for states to provide fewer procedural safeguards in that setting. 101 Since in reducing the procedural ·safeguards
available to juveniles the state has committed no constitutional violation, "there is no legally cognizable quo to trigger a compensatory
quid."102
The difficulty with the Santana court's argument is that it ignores
the critical question of why less process is due in the juvenile context.
Certainly, the unique problems posed by juvenile delinquency may demand a different approach to due process than is required in adult,
criminal proceedings. However, essential to the continued constitutionality of procedural distinctions is a determination that the "interests of the individual and of society" 103 do in fact differ in the two
settings. The First Circuit thought such a determination unnecessary
since, in its view, the Supreme Court had already balanced the respective interests of society and juvenile delinquents and concluded that
reduced procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings are constitutionally permissible. 104 The First Circuit failed to consider, however,
95. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
97. 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
98. 714 F.2d at 1177.
99. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585 (1975) ("It is too well established to
require extended discussion that due process is not an inflexible concept."); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require
citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.").
100. Santana, 714 F.2d at 1177 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
101. 714 F.2d at 1177. The court concluded that "no amount of treatment" would compensate plaintiff's for an unconstitutional deprivation of procedural safeguards. 714 F.2d at 1177.
102. 714 F.2d at 1177.
103. See text at note 100 supra.
104. See text at note 101 supra.
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that the Supreme Court was prepared to accept reduced procedural
protection for juveniles precisely and only because it sought to free the
states to pursue the nonpunitive, rehabilitative aims of the juvenile system.105 When reductions in constitutional protections are justified on
the assumption that states will pursue particular objectives, it is incumbent upon the courts to inquire whether those objectives are actually being fulfilled.106
Should a court determine that the state has failed to utilize its
greater flexibility in conducting juvenile proceedings to pursue meaningful rehabilitative programs, it must then decide whether to impose
upon that state an affirmative obligation to provide rehabilitative treatment. According to proponents of the quid pro quo theory, a court is
empowered to create a new substantive right to treatment in response
to the denial of procedural safeguards. 107 Indeed, justice would seem
to require the state to provide treatment when it has been permitted 108
to reduce procedural safeguards for the purpose of facilitating such
treatment. For various reasons, however, it may be inappropriate for
a court to countenance such an exchange of rights.
One practical objection to providing treatment in lieu of procedural safeguards is that the proposed exchange "makes no sense." 109
If, as a consequence of less rigorous procedures, a juvenile is erroneously incarcerated for an act he did not commit, he is obviously not in
need of rehabilitative treatment. 110 Yet it is treatment that the proponents of the quid pro quo argument offer as "compensation" for the
relaxation of procedural safeguards.
This criticism of the quid pro quo theory has substantial force only
if one accepts the premise that relaxed procedures in the juvenile setting will inevitably result in a substantial increase in erroneous commitments. That premise, however, is probably flawed. The term
"procedural safeguards" has been employed in a much broader con105. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
106. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("Where claims that the State is acting in the best interests of an individual are said to justify
reduced procedural and substantive safeguards, this Court's decisions require that they be 'candidly appraised.'") (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)); cf. note 78 supra.
107. But see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("A ... troublesome feature of the quid pro quo theory is that it would elevate a concern for
essentially procedural safeguards into a new substantive constitutional right.").
108. See note 123 infra and accompanying text.
109. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1788
n.140 (1981).
110. Professor Garvey writes, in the context of a right to treatment for the mentally ill:
If the state - because of a relaxed procedure - locks up a sane person, he would hardly
consider it a fair trade if he were treated for schizophrenia. And, if the state locked up a
person for five years after proving by the most procedurally scrupulous methods possible
that he was schizophrenic, he might properly feel cheated that the state refused to provide
treatment after proving so carefully that he needed it.
Id. at 1788 n.140.
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text than the above argument suggests. Many of these so-called "safeguards," such as the right to confront witnesses 111 and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 112 are indeed essential in reducing the risk of error in juvenile proceedings. 113 The term
has also been used, however, to refer to the right to bail, 114 the right to
be confined apart from adults, 115 and other protections not in any way
associated with the minimization of erroneous decisions. 116 The
Supreme Court, recognizing that even civil commitment is a serious
intrusion on personal liberty, has required the states to provide those
"procedural safeguards" considered most vital in preventing erroneous
adjudications. 117 It is conceivable, then, that the juvenile is being deprived only of those "procedural safeguards" that serve benefits other
than the prevention of erroneous decisions. To the extent that this is
true, it is not absurd to compensate for the reduction of "safeguards"
with rehabilitative treatment.
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to creating a substantive right to treatment as the quid pro quo for the deprivation of
procedural safeguards. The notion of a quid pro quo i~ that one party
has promised "something" in exchange for "something." 118 But the
111. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42, 56 (1967); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971
(D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
112. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
113. See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
114. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971 (D.P.R.
1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
115. Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 971 (D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
116. See Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (D.P.R. 1982), affd., 714 F.2d 1172
(1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
117. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 368 (1970) ("The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent
child"; therefore, juvenile proceedings that might conceivably result in prolonged confinement
require that guilt be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
21, 31-59 (1967) Guvenile offenders must be permitted, inter alia, to confront witnesses, retain
counsel, and receive notice of the charges against them; "[i]t is these instruments of due process
which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions
and conflicting data").
The most vital procedural safeguard denied to juvenile offenders is the right to trial by jury.
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). However, there seems to be no basis to
conclude a priori that a judge will render a greater quantity of erroneous decisions than a lay
jury. See 403 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., plurality) ("The imposition of the jury trial on the
juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function •..."); 403
U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring) ("Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that body
is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge."). What the
juvenile loses from the absence of a jury trial may be leniency rather than accuracy. By appealing to the "community conscience," the juvenile, though guilty of the substantive offense, may
receive more humanitarian treatment. 403 U.S. at 554-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
118. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979)(defining "quid pro quo" as "[w]hat
for what, something for something ... nothing more than the mutual consideration which passes
between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding").
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Supreme Court has never suggested that the states are obligated to
provide rehabilitative treatment as the consideration for reduced procedural safeguards. If there were a constitutional basis for positing a
substantive right to treatment, it would have been simple for the Court
to have held that states must provide rehabilitative treatment in lieu of
procedural safeguards. Instead, the Court merely tried to encourage
states to provide rehabilitation by freeing them from the strict procedural requirements that are mandated in adult proceedings. 119 When
the states fail to provide rehabilitative treatment - thereby spurning
the Court's enticement - it does not follow that they suddenly acquire an affirmative obligation to furnish that treatment. The constitutional infirmity in this situation is a procedural one, the state having
relied on the supposed benevolence of the juvenile justice system to
deprive juveniles of procedural safeguards. Rather than creating a
new, substantive constitutional right out of a procedural defect, the
proper response is for a court to evaluate - in light of the realities of
the juvenile justice system - whether the "demands of due process"12o in fact justify reduced procedural protection.1 21 Indeed, this
has been the Supreme Court's typical response to evidence that the
juvenile justice system has failed in its mission to act in the juvenile's
welfare. 122
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Supreme Court has
never mandated that states provide fewer procedural safeguards in juvenile proceedings. Rather, it has merely held that certain safeguards
are not constitutionally required. 123 Predictably, then, the quantity
119. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971):
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant
to say .•. that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on
the availability of resources, on the interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to
learn, and on understanding as to cause and effect and cure. In this field, as in so many
others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of
the young, and we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury

trial.
(Emphasis added.) See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the ''worthy goal" as opposed to the requirement, of rehabilitation, and cautioning
that certain procedural strictures might interfere with the states' ability to achieve that goal)
(emphasis added).
120. See text at note 100 supra.
121. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(courts should evaluate the adequacy of the procedures rather than accept the absence of procedural safeguards and offer in their place what the court considers to be adequate "compensation"); text at notes 103-06 supra.
122. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-31 (1967) (In theory, strict procedural safeguards
were unnecessary in juvenile courts since the state was proceeding, not as adversary, but as
parens patriae. Since reality departs significantly from theory, the state must provide the juvenile
with the fundamental due process safeguards.); see also note 138 infra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) ("If, in its wisdom, any
State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no
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and character of procedural safeguards afforded in juvenile proceedings will vary from state to state. As with the purpose argument, this
factual variation makes it exceedingly difficult to posit a constitutional
right to treatment for all involuntarily confined juveniles.124
An illustrative case is Santana v. Collazo, 125 in which the district
court carefully scrutinized the procedural safeguards available to
juveniles in the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 126 The court discovered that a panoply of procedural safeguards were available to
juveniles, 127 including several that were not available to adults. 128 In
view of this favorable dispensation of procedural due process rights,
the court concluded that "the juvenile justice system of Puerto Rico
places a juvenile defendant in a privileged position, not in one of constitutional disadvantage."129
For present purposes, the accuracy of the court's assessment of the
juvenile system in Puerto Rico is immaterial. The central point is that
the structure of the juvenile court system is largely a matter of state
law - subject of course to the minimum requirements imposed by the
Supreme Court. 130 As such, it is impossible to determine a priori
whether juveniles have been placed at a "constitutional disadvantage"131 in any particular state. Only when a state actually employs
the rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile system to justify a reduction in procedural safeguards - and then proceeds to withhold the
requisite rehabilitation - does it offend constitutional principles.
Even then, the appropriate remedy would be an insistence on the procedural safeguards rather than a broad right to treatment.132
C.

The Eighth Amendment

Finally, some courts have suggested that confinement of juveniles
impediment to its installing a system embracing that feature. That, however, is the State's privilege and not its obligation.").
124. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text.
125. 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), ajfd., 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 974 (1984).
126. 533 F. Supp. at 970-71.
127. These included adequate prior notice of all hearings, the right to counsel - free of
charge when necessary - and full rights of confrontation, cross-examination and presentation of
evidence. 533 F. Supp. at 971. The only "substantial right" denied to juveniles was the right to a
trial by jury, although the court noted that even adults in the co=onwealth of Puerto Rico
were not "constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in criminal cases." 533 F. Supp. at 971 (citing
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)) (emphasis in original).
128. 533 F. Supp. at 970-71. For example, no fingerprints or photographs of the juvenile
could be taken without judicial authority, and no records of juvenile proceedings could be made
available to the public.
129. 533 F. Supp. at 972.
130. See note 117 supra.
131. See text at note 129 supra.
132. See notes 118-22 supra and accompanying text.
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without treatment may constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment. 133 As a threshold matter, it must
be determined whether the eighth amendment applies at all to conditions of civil confinement. Although several lower courts have assumed that the eighth amendment applies to the civil confinement of
juveniles, 134 that conclusion is by no means obvious. In Ingraham v.
Wright, 135 two schoolchildren brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claiming that the infliction of corporal punishment in the public
schools constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. This setting provided the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to canvass the history of the eighth amendment. Noting
that the "original design of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was to limit criminal punishments," and distinguishing the
"openness of the public school and its supervision by the community"
from the "harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration," the
Court concluded that the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in the public schools.136
In an important footnote, however, the Court acknowledged that
the eighth amendment question could not fully be resolved by recourse
to labels:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be
sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in
which they are administered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). We have no occasion in this
case, for example, to consider whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim
the protection of the Eighth Amendment.13 7

The above reference to In re Gault assumes special significance in the
context of juvenile confinement. In Gault, the Supreme Court mandated that certain procedural safeguards be afforded in juvenile proceedings, citing the congruence, in practice, between the rigors of civil
and criminal confinement. 138 Emphasizing the helplessness of the in133. See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text. The eighth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976).
134. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
135. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
136. See 430 U.S. at 664-671 (emphasis added).
137. 430 U.S. at 669 n.37 (emphasis added); see also Note, Right to Treatment for the Civilly
Committed: A New Eighth Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1978) (construing this
footnote to suggest that the eighth amendment might afford a right to treatment to involuntarily
confined mental patients).
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967):
Ultimately ..• we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile Court process with
which we deal •... [H]owever euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial
school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented
routine and institutional hours." • . • [H]is world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape
and homicide.
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carcerated juvenile, 139 the Court refused to permit the state to escape
its constitutional obligations simply by attaching the word "civil" to
its confinement of juvenile delinquents. Given that both juvenile delinquents and criminals are ordinarily incarcerated in harsh institutions, 140 albeit through different procedures, it seems logical to extend
the eighth amendment's proscriptions to the involuntary confinement
of juvenile offenders.141
The more difficult issue is whether the failure to provide rehabilitative treatment is somehow "cruel and unusual." The argument that it
is cruel and unusual has not been articulated in the federal courts. 142
Since it has never been suggested that the eighth amendment affords a
right to treatment to those adjudged "criminally responsible," 143 the
argument must rest on the distinction between those incarcerated for
criminal behavior and those confined on alternative grounds. In short,
the argument would be that confinement without treatment of those
who have not been convicted of crimes offends "evolving standards of
decency" 144 in contravention of the eighth amendment.
Viewed in this light, it appears that the eighth amendment argument is nothing but a restatement of the purpose argument. 145 Just as
it is a "fundamental" violation of due process to "deprive any citizen
(Footnotes omitted.)
139. See note 138 supra; see also Note, supra note 137, at 741 (The civilly confined person
shares the harshest element of the prisoner's criminal conviction, involuntary confinement, which
"renders the prisoner helpless and in need of protection," and places him or her "at the state's
mercy for the necessities of life and health.").
140. See note 138 supra.
141. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179-80 (1st Cir. 1983)(use of isolation to discipline juveniles held in detention centers analyzed under eighth amendment standards), cert denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). But see Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1462-63 (11th Cir. 1984)
(conditions of involuntary commitment should be judged under due process rather than eighth
amendment standards).
142. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
143. Cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Indefinite confinement
without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as
to be 'cruel and unusual punishment.' ").
144. Various phrases have been invoked to define the words "cruel and unusual." In Estelle
v. Gamble, the Court noted that the eighth amendment "embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency,' " and concluded that the amendment
therefore proscribes punishments that are "incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citations omitted).
Further on in the opinion, the Court appeared to backtrack from this broad view of the amendment, employing descriptive phrases such as "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind." 429 U.S. at 105-06. In Martorella v. Kelley, where
the court held that the confinement of "PINS" (persons in need of supervision) without treatment violated the eighth amendment, see notes 21-24 & 48 supra and accompanying text, the
standard was whether conditions and practices were "so bad" as to be "shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people." 349 F. Supp. 575, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Needless to say,
this terminology is anything but precise.
145. See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (when state acts as
parens patriae, it assumes an obligation under both the fourteenth and eighth amendments tQ
furnish adequate treatment).
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of his or her liberty upon the altruistic notion that the confinement is
for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate
treatment," 146 so it is "cruel and unusual" to confine a juvenile for acts
of delinquency that fall short of criminal behavior and then fail to
make efforts to return that juvenile to society as a responsible citizen.
Cast in different terms, and grounded on separate amendments, the
two arguments appear indistinguishable. 147 Essentially, both require
the state to tailor its confinement of juvenile offenders to the rationale
for depriving them of their liberty.1 48
The eighth amendment argument therefore suffers from the same
deficiencies as the purpose argument. 149 In certain cases, it will undeniably be true that incarceration without treatment violates "evolving
standards of decency." 150 To confine a juvenile in an institution without any sort of guidance because he or she is a habitual truant or runaway151 would be "shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized
people." 152 The same may not be true, however, of a habitual thief,
rapist or arsonist. In view of the fact that these juveniles will eventually be released, it might be wise as a matter of social policy to establish a rehabilitative program. 153 This decision, however, involves the
delicate balancing of societal resources; it is not a matter of federal
constitutional law.
146. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971); see text at note 79 supra.
147. The arguments may possibly be distinguished on the ground that all juveniles, irrespcc·
tive of whether they have committed serious crimes, are incapable of forming criminal intent.
See note 67 supra and accompanying text. This, if true, would implicate the statement in Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that confinement without treatment of those not
"criminally responsible" may be so inhumane as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment."
See note 143 supra.
However, the assumption that all juvenile delinquents are incapable of forming criminal in·
tent is rather dubious. Depending on the state, juvenile delinquents may be as old as eighteen
years of age. See R. MENNEL, supra note 20, at xi; text at note 27 supra. At common law, only
children below the age of seven were deemed to lack the "legal ability" to form criminal intent.
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 15; see also /11 re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967). And, between the ages of seven and fourteen, there was a rebuttable presumption that
juveniles were capable of forming the requisite intent. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra
note 67, at 15; cf. /11 re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 (children over age seven subject to arrest, trial, and
punishment as adults). Of course, proof in any individual case that the juvenile was not responsi·
ble for his or her actions would raise serious eighth amendment concerns were that juvenile to be
punished as a criminal.
148. See Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("[I]ncarceration of
juveniles/or rehabilitatio11 violates the Eighth Amendment when the reality of the imprisonment
is punishment, not treatment.") (emphasis added).
149. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
ISO. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
152. See note 144 supra.
153. See note 84 supra and accompanying text; see also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) ("Without a program of individual treatment the
result may be that the juveniles will not be rehabilitated, but warehoused, and that at the termination of detention they will likely be incapable of taking their proper places in free society.").
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CONCLUSION

Undeniably, there are compelling reasons to insist on rehabilitation
of juvenile offenders - if not of all persons incarcerated in state prisons and institutions. This Note, however, has addressed itself to the
narrower question of whether states are constitutionally obligated to
rehabilitate juvenile delinquents. An analysis of the constitutional theories supporting a right to rehabilitation suggests a unifying theme:
Before broad constitutional claims to treatment can be evaluated, a
thorough factual inquiry must be conducted into the circumstances
surrounding the confinement.
A court confronted with such claims must inquire into the authority relied upon and the procedures used by the state in depriving the
juvenile of his or her liberty. If the state must depend on its parens
patriae power to deprive juveniles of their liberty, the Constitution delimits the power of the state to confine the juveniles without treatment.
Moreover, if the state is unwilling to provide rehabilitative treatment,
it may not cite the benevolence of the juvenile justice system to justify
reduced procedural safeguards. However, if the deprivation of liberty
is justified as a valid exercise of the state's police power, and is accompanied by procedures that reflect the realities of the juvenile justice
system, then the Constitution is silent regarding the allocation of
scarce societal resources.
-
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